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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND CAMPUS
DISORDER: A COMPARISON OF LAW AND
PRACTICE*
CONTEMPORARY CAMPUS MILIEU
The phenomenon of campus-wide civil disorder has emerged upon
either total procedural voids or traditional disciplinary systems
created to punish individual transgressions, often of an academic
nature. This strain on institutional capacity has been accentuated by
the application of constitutional mdndates resulting from the judicial
review of collegiate discipline. Some institutions responded to these
factors by creating specialized tribunals, composed of representatives
from different segments of the academic community, to handle only
cases arising from campus disorders. Undergraduate tribunals often
became immersed in the complexities of procedural due process; the
resulting difficulties sometimes necessitated the modification of
existing procedures. Whatever the form taken by the reaction to civil
disorders on campuses, it was generally guided by the desire to
balance the constitutional demands for adequate procedures against
the maintenance of institutional independence and integrity.
This project was designed to compile and compare the various
procedural systems developed throughout the American college and
university community. Extensive analysis of the procedural standards
which have been considered constitutionally required was not
attempted. These issues have been discussed in depth in the legal
periodicals' and are presented here only in summary for the purpose
of comparison with the actual practices discovered.The project seeks
to inform the educational community of the various approaches being
used and to indicate the extent to which these schemes would
withstand attack on the basis of current and developing judicial
standards. The study recognizes that all institutions of higher learning
* This project was conducted under a research grant from the American Bar Foundation. The
Journal wishes to express its.appreciation for this support from the Foundation; however, the
analyses, conclusions, and opinions expressed are those of the authors, not those of the
Foundation, its officers and directors, or others associated with its work.
1. A "selected bibliography on student rights" can be found in Van Alstyne, The Student as
University Resident, 45 DENVER L.J. 582,612-13 (1968). For an updating of the procedural due
process portion of that bibliography, see Appendix A, page 808 infra.
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are not necessarily legally required to conform their procedures to
provide the elements of due process. Public institutions are
und6ubtedly required to comply with constitutional standards as
applied by the fourteenth amendment; applicability of the same
standards to private institutions depends on whether their activities
are considered "state action," an issue of intense contemporary
debate, the relevant arguments being outlined below.2 However, it is
assumed that most schools, whether required by law or not, desire to
provide procedures that are fundamentally fair within the context of
their individual needs. It is hoped that this project will be instrumental
in furthering that end.
The methodological technique employed was quite simple. A
questionnaire3 was mailed to every college or university, accredited or
unaccredited, known to the American Council on Education with the
exception of approximately two-hundred addressees who were either
military installations, theological seminaries, or other institutions
determined to be unrepresentative. Solicitations were made to 2,115
institutions, and 572 or 27 percent replied although only 536 replies
were usable. The questionnaire requested a copy of the procedural
system employed by the institution and answers to 69 specific
questions! Replies to the questionnaire ranged from sophisticated
procedural compendia to a complete lack of written procedures or
regulations. Reasons for dispensing with any written standards varied
from the divine-right concept that atttending college is a privilege, not
a'right, thereby justifying immediate suspension of those challenging
the administrative hierarchy,5 to the'belief that written procedures
2. See pages 795-807 infra.
3. The questionnaire and the results of the survey are reprinted in the Appendix B, page 811
infra.
4. To understand the statistics utilized throughout the project, one must be aware of the
distinction between the total "replies" received and the "responses" contained in such replies.
Except where indicated, all percentages are derived from the total number of replies to a
question. The total will, therefore, be composed of percentages for positive responses plus a
percentage for the "no responses" to the particular question. Since most of the "no responses"
probably indicate an absence of the particular procedure solicited, ignoring them would have
created a distorted picture of actual campus due process.
5. The following quotations from replies are intended only to illustrate the widely divergent
views on this subject and are not meant to criticize the approach taken by any school. "We say
that attendance at University is a privilege and not a right, and any student who
violates that privilege either by a breach of regulations or by an attempt to stir up rebellion




breed unlawful activity and endanger civil liberty.' a concept that the
drafters of the Bill of Rights rejected almost two-hundred years ago.
Many schools expressed a desire to develop disorder guidelines
patterned on the questionnaire; 7 others indicated faith in the more
fundamentalist approach of relying on "the bible and the law." One
of the more surprising replies came from a school of criminal justice
which had not yet developed any specific regulations
EMERGENCE OF STUDENT PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
In 1961, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Education' held that the fourteenth
amendment required that tax-supported colleges give students notice
and an opportunity to be heard before they could be expelled for non-
academic misconduct. 0 This decision represented a departure from
existing case law in the area; earlier cases had not considered whether
notice and a hearing were required but had focused instead on the
question whether the particular hearing and notice provided were
adequate to prevent arbitrary and capricious action by colleges in
6. Our aim is to govern the campus according to civil libertarian principles and to add as few
regulations as possible to those laws of the community that already apply to students as
citizens. . . [W]e have even very deliberately avoided any fancy kind of "contingency
planning" when faced with the prospect of disturbance, despite pressures to the contrary .. "
"[D]eliberations concerning [contingency] plans and especially their publication can have a
provocative effect. . . . There is the risk, in sum, that contingency plans will become self-
fulfilling prophecies. . . . If and when the need arises [for disciplinary actions], which I hope
never happens (your questionnaire describes a chamber of legalistic horrors that must have
devastating effects on an academic community), our commitment to civil libertarian principles
would require the guarantee of due process. Id.
7. Although the questionnaire was intended to be neutral, several schools found it to possess
substantive import. "I have retained the questionnaire as a guideline for us." "I would like to
retain the text of the questionnaire to use as guidelines for discussions that would lead to formal
regulations insuring due process for our students in this area." "We have been discussing
procedures such as you are toncerned with because we are well aware that approaches such as
ours will soon go the way of the dinosaurs, even in such sheltered enclaves as this. With your
permission I would like to retain the questionnaire as an indication of what we may have to deal
with." Id. But see "After attempting to answer the questionnaire, I find that the philosophical
approach is incompatible with our operation. We view our hearing board not as a court of law,
but rather as a place to ascertain facts and attitudes and communicate expectations. . .. I hope
we don't forfeit our position and join the legal approach." Id. Another reply interpreted the
questionnaire as urging the "civil rights" approach.
8. "We do not, at the present time, have any specific set of regulations governing behavior
although our general policy is to permit students full privacy, right to counsel, and all other due
process privileges in any student discipline cases. Id.
9. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
10. Id. at 151.
Vol. 1970:763],
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
dismissing students." The court, however, in overcoming the
judiciary's traditional reluctance to delve into the conundrum of
academic due process, left unanswered many questions concerning
students' procedural rights. It required only that a student under
threat of expulsion for engaging in campus disturbances be provided a
statement of specific charges which, if proved, would justify such a
penalty. A hearing containing procedural safeguards greater than
those present in an informal interview, but less than those of a "full-
dress judicial hearing," was also required. 2 Although implying that
the right of cross-examination was not constitutionally compelled, 3
the opinion did not discuss whether the student at the hearing had a
right to counsel, a privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the
right to appellate review with a college-furnished transcript to
expedite such review, the right to confront witnesses against him, or
the right to require an open hearing. Nor did Dixon consider the
,perplexing questions concerning student rights outside the hearing,
such as discovery and interim suspension, or determine the severity of
sanction that had to be threatened before the Constitution required
the procedural safeguards outlined by the court.
In the period from 1961 to the present the judiciary has struggled
with these questions, but their answers and the resulting guidelines for
colleges have been far from clear. In balancing the students' interests
against those of the institution, the courts have arrived at widely
divergent results. The value of the following exposition of the present
state of the law is, therefore, a guide to the minimal procedure an
institution should provide in order to avoid court interference in a
university's handling of campus disorders.
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS PRIOR TO THE HEARING
Regulations Governing Disorder
While the content of regulations governing campus disorders is a
11. See, e.g., Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 966 (1960); Carr v. St. John's Univ., 34 Misc. 2d 319,231 N.YS.2d 403 (Sup.
Ct.), rev'd 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, affd mem., 12 N.Y.S.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d
18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962). See also Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231
N.Y.S.435 (1928). -
12. 294 F.2d at 159. It is clear from the cases, however, that a university need not charge all
participants in a demonstration and may prosecute only the instigators of disruptive activities
when such persons can be identified. See, e.g., Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F.
Supp. 747, 767 (W.D. La. 1968). The college, in other words, need not dismiss half the
enrollment in order to expel the few students mainly responsible for the disruption.
13. 294 F.2d at 159.
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substantive matter largely beyond the pale of the present inquiry, the
existence of rules is a basic issue of procedural due. process. If no
guides to proper conduct exist, the procedures for punishing conduct
later determined to be illegitimate are fundamentally defective. The
necessity for published rules is actually a matter of some dispute; for
example, the authors of the recent Report of the American Bar
Association Commission on Campus Government and Student
Dissent were unable to assert "either that a university may never act
against a student other than pursuant to a published rule clearly
furnishing the basis for a specific charge or that it may freely act
against the student even in the absence of any clearly applicable and
previously published rule."' 4
Without venturing into questions concerning unconstitutional
vagueness and overbreadth,'5 the questionnaire asked whether the
institution published regulations governing campus disorders. Sixty-
six percent6 of the schools responding to the questionnaire indicated
that they provided and published regulations applicable to campus
disorders. While the regulations varied substantially from those
providing minimal notice to detailed specificity, it is significant that
27 percent of the replying institutions did not even provide students
with minimal written guidelines of acceptable behavior concerning
campus disorders. Failure to provide such guidelines highlights the
punitive rather than the preventive functions of such university
authorities. Although detailed codification of campus regulations
may be undesirable,17 the presence of even general guidelines might
educate students as to likely responses of campus authorities to
certain activities and possibly deter confrontations designed to "test"
the university administration's resolve or to solicit the university's
position on fundamental issues. Arguably, the absence of substantive
campus disorder regulations necessarily emphasizes reliance on an
ability to react to disorders rather than on the utilization of foresight
in attempting to prevent needless confrontation through an informed
student body.
14. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON CAMPUS GOVERNMENT
AND STUDENT DISSENT 21 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT].
15. Three of the recent writings in the vagueness-overbreadth area are Note, Uncertainty in
College Disciplinary Regulations, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (1968); 4 GA. L. REV. 221 (1969); 40
U. COL. L. REV.453 (1968).
16. All percentages specified in this project are contained in the "Sample Questionnaire and
Summary of Results" in Appendix B infra.
17. SeeABA REPORT21.
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Notification of Charges
Some courts have held that students who are charged with
violating college regulations concerning campus disorders must be
notified in writing' at least one week before the hearing'9 and that the
notice must specify the grounds upon which the charge is based.0
However, if the student cannot be located after a good faith, diligent
effort, there is authority for the proposition that he need not actually
receive notice before expulsion."' The reason for imposing these
safeguards is, of course, to provide the student adequate time and
information to be able to prepare a defense to the charges against
him. 2 To insure the fundamental fairness that the fourteenth
amendment requires and that informed decisions are made in what are
basically factual disputes, the student must be allowed to marshal his
evidence. To this end, the student should be furnished the names of the
witnesses against him,23 at least where' a complete adversary
proceeding is not a requirement, and be allowed to inspect affidavits
18. General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student
Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968)
(en banc) [hereinafter referred to as General Order]; Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161,
171 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (citing General Order); see Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F.
Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967), affd 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. filed. 38 U.S.L.W.
3256 (US. Jan. 13, 1970), noted in 49 NEa. L. REv. 689 (1970).See generally 4 GA. L. REV. 221
(1969).
19. In Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967), and
Schiff v. Hannah, 282 F. Supp. 381,383 (W.D. Mich. 1966), it was held that 10 days notice was
required. However, less time has been approved by the courts. See, e.g., Zanders v. Board of
Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747,760 (W.D. La: 1968) (one week); Jones v. Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp.
190, 199 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), affd407 F.2d 834 (4th Cir. 1969),petition for cert. dismissed, 397
U.S. 31 (1970) (two days); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396,398-99 (N.D. Fla,
1963) (at hearing).
20. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1960); Woody v.
Burnus, 188 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
21. In Wright v. Texas So. Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex. 1967), affd, 392 F.2d 728 (5th
Cir. 1968), the plaintiffs, who had been involved in a campus disturbance, had changed their
addresses without notifying the university, thereby violating a university regulation. The Dean in
one instance personally asked plaintiff Wright to talk with him; when Wright did not appear the
Dean found that even Wright's family did not know of his whereabouts. A university letter to
plaintiff Richards was returned undelivered. Such attempts were held sufficient by the court to
satisfy due process requirements. Id. at 112-13.
22. In one case, the notice was required to contain reference to the specific university rule
allegedly violated. See Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La.
1968).
23. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
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or exhibits which the college intends to submit at the pending
hearing! 4 However, there is no authority to support an institutional
demand to inspect a student-defendant's documents and to acquire
the names of his witnesses2
Seventy-nine percent of the colleges and universities replying
indicated that they provided an accused student with a written
statement of the charges against him. Only 24 percent gave at least
seven days notice as required by some courts although 55 percent of
those replying acknowledged that they gave at least two days notice.
Only nine percent provided less than two days notice. Seven percent
asserted that they provided written notice but failed to indicate any
time period, possibly indicating a lack of formal, consistent
procedures. Approximately 80 percent had an established procedure
for conveying notice of charges to a student, the methods varying
from ordinary mail to personal interview. Fifty-two percent of those
reporting also provided students with the names of adverse witnesses,
and 57 percent permitted the examination of affidavits, exhibits, and
statements of complaining witnesses prior to the hearing. Though
there is no legal authority to support such a claim, 44 percent of the
replying schools claimed a similar prerogative to inspect student
documents and acquire the names of student witnesses.
Searches and Seizures
The question of whether the fourth amendment should or will be
applied to prevent university officials from conducting warrantless
searches of students' dormitory rooms is currently unresolved. 8 The
24. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967). See
Frank v. Marquette Univ., 209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932). In Frank, the plaintiff, having
been denied a diploma, sought to acquire university records concerning disciplinary sanctions
placed on other students who had received diplomas. Access was denied because he could not
show the materiality of the documents sought to the issue of whether the university acted
arbitrarily in denying him a diploma, thus implying that had this showing been made, he would
have succeeded. See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 1; Note, Reasonable Rules, Reasonably
Enforced-Guidelines for University Disciplinary Proceedings. 53 MINN. L. REV. 301, 323-24
(1968).
25. Possibly no university has ever made such a demand. At any rate, in most cases the
question will likely be moot because the University will probably control all the pertinent
information.
26. See Comment, Public Universities and Due Process ofLaw: Students' Protection Against
Unreasonable Search andSeizure, 17 KANSAS L. REV. 512 (1969); 53 MINN. L. REV., supra note
24, at 324 .See also Note, College Searches and Seizures: Privacy and Due Process Problems on
Campus, 3 GA. L. REv. 427 (1969); Note, The Relationship of the Fourth Amendment to
Student Disciplinary Hearings. 30 U. PITT. L. REV. 561 (1969).
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limited authority available indicates that the student cannot prevent
college officials from searching his room in his presence where the
college reasonably believes that the room is being used for an illegal
purpose. In Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State
University7 the court refused to apply the exclusionary rule at a
subsequent disciplinary hearing to bar the introduction into evidence
of marijuana found as a result of a warrantless search of a student's
room. In balancing the student's right to be free from unreasonable
searches against the university's obligation to insure campus order
and maintain an educational atmosphere, the court found the college
regulation permitting such searches reasonable and upheld it.28
Though at the present time neither the fourth amendment nor the
exclusionary rule applies to protect students at university disciplinary
hearings, 50 percent of the schools replying indicated that their
hearing boards could not consider evidence obtained in violation of
law or university regulations. Only 16 percent indicated that they
would use such evidence, the remainder failing to respond.
Miranda Warnings
Similarly, the strictures of the fifth amendment have seldom been
successfully imposed on university activities prior to disciplinary
hearings. No case has held that a student subject to university
sanctions rmust be advised of his procedural rights."9 Since the
application of the privilege against self-incrimination at the hearing is
itself problematic,30 there is little reason to suppose that Mirandad
will apply to college disciplinary proceedings. The courts have
27. 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968); see 3 GA. L. REv. 223 (1968).
28. The court rejected the in loco parentis and contractual theories of student-university
relationship, but nevertheless stated that the university "may infringe to some extent on the
outer bounds of the Fourth Amendment rights of students" in holding the criminal standard of
probable cause inapplicable. 284 F. Supp. at 729. The case has been soundly criticized by the
.commentators on the ground that the university was not forced to justify its regulation by
showing that there were no effective, less drastic alternatives or that the benefits to the university
accruing from the rule outweighed its detrimental effects on students. See note 26 supra. See also
People v. Kelly, 195 Cal. App. 2d 669, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Ct. App. 1961); People v. Overton, 20
N.Y.2d 360,283 N.Y.S.2d 22,229 N.E.2d 596 (1967).
29. In Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968), the court stated that it knew of
"no legal authority that requires university officials to advise a student involved in disciplinary
proceedings of his right to remain silent. ... Id. at 287.See General Order, supra, note 18, at
147; 40 U. CoLo. L. REv. 453 (1968).
30. See notes 107-109 infra and accompanying text.
31. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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repeatedly stated that the procedure for expulsion need not contain all
the safeguards inherent in a criminal proceeding 2 because to so rule
would be "impractical and detrimental to the educational atmosphere
and functions of a university."' ' From this point of view, Miranda's
application could easily be seen as infringing too extensively upon
university autonomy and the educational process and as unnecessary
in most cases to insure fairness.
The colleges and universities replying to the questionnaire
indicated a mixed commitment to fifth amendment principles.
Although 77 percent declared that a student had the right to remain
silent during any pre-hearing investigation, while only two percent did
not provide this right, only 51 percent indicated that silence would not
be commented on at the hearing, and 19 percent answered that they
would comment. Perhaps a substantial number of the "no responses"
to these questions are the product of an unwillingness to deny what is
generally deemed to be a fundamental individual right. Fifty-seven
percent of the replying schools indicated that a student was warned of
his right to remain silent and of the possibility of self-incrimination
during pre-hearing investigations, a procedure surpassing the rights
provided by present case law in the area. Only 17 percent responded
that such a warning was not given. The results of the questionnaire
certainly indicate that colleges and universities have in some instances
substantially exceeded the judicary in protecting students from
compulsory self-incrimination.
Concurrent University-Criminal Jurisdiction
.Delay of University Prosecutions. Students have been
unsuccessful in enjoining the initiation of university hearings until
after the completion of local criminal prosecutions brought as a result
of disruptive campus activity.5 Students subject to both university
32. See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1960);
Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867,881,57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 473
(1967).
33. 248 Cal. App. 2d 867,881, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463,473 (1967).
34. See General Order, supra note 18, at 147. But see Note, Admissibility of Testimony
Coerced by a University, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 435 (1970).
35. See, e.g., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463. The court stated that it could not
"accept the contention that where certain conduct is violative of both the rules and regulations
of the university and the statutes of the state that the discipline imposed by the academic
community must wait the outcome of the other proceedings." 248 Cal. App. 2d at 885, 57 Cal."
Rptr. at 476. The petitioner, as a result of his activities in organizing and participating in a
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and criminal sanctions have argued that if the university procedures
are not delayed, they could be forced to render statements before a
disciplinary hearing which could subsequently be used against them in
local criminal proceedings3 This argument has not been accepted
because the alleged injury has been deemed too speculative. The
students may not necessarily be forced to incriminate themselves in
order to avoid expulsion, and, in the event such statements are made,
they will not necessarily be introduced in a subsequent criminal
proceeding3 Further, if incriminating statements are made and
subsequently introduced as evidence, at least one court has assumed
that a student may invoke Garrity v. New Jersey3s in opposition to the
prosecutor's proffer in the criminal action 9 It seems clear, therefore,
that the assertion of fifth amendment privileges will be insufficient to
delay administrative disciplinary proceedings.
University Punishment for Violating Local Laws. A closely
related problem to the issue of delay is that of university sanctions
imposed on students for violations of local law. Although vigorously
criticized," the cases indicate that the imposition of university
campus rally at which he was moderator, was charged with "unbecoming behavior" by the
university and with violation of the obscenity statute and disturbing the peace by the local
authorities.
36. See Grossner v. Trustees of Colum. Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The
students' argument failed because at the hearing they could have stood mute and because the
hearing had not yet been held, thus-rendering any fifth amendment claims speculative. See notes
107-109 infra and accompanying text.
37. See Furutani v. Ewigleben, 297 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
38. 385 U.S. 493 (1967). In Garrity, police officers questioned concerning traffic ticket fixing
were confronted with the choice of either incriminating themselves or losing their jobs under a
statute providing for the removal of officials who refused to answer questions before a
commission investigating the official's conduct in office. The Supreme Court held that
statements made under these circumstances were coerced and therefore inadmissible in
subsequent prosecutions. Although the case seems analogous to the student's situation, its
applicability is by no means assured to protect the student's fifth amendment privileges.
Moreover, it is highly unlikely that a student would be willing to make incriminatory statements
relying solely on Garrity in an attempt to remain in school. To this extent, the rationale of
Furutani v. Ewigleben, 297 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Cal. 1969), seems deficient.
39. 297 F. Supp. at 1165.
40. See Monypenny, Toward a Standard for Student Academic Freedom, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 625, 629 (1963); Van Alstyne, supra note I; Wright, The Constitution on the
Campus. 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1068-69 (1969). The unifying theme of the commentators on
this point is that no purpose is served by an additional university prosecution unless the college
has a distinct interest to be protected which has not been vindicated by public prosecution. As an
example, the student convicted of selling heroin should be compared with the situation of a
student charged with contempt of court. An additional university prosecution in the latter case
resulting in expulsion would serve no distinct interest, but in the former situation, such an
interest is readily discernible.
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sanctions in this situation is permissible.! The rationale for this
position grows out of what has come to be recognized as the
university's inherent rule-making authority.!2 Since it is ostensibly the
university's function to provide a learning environment both for the
individual student and the academic community, the college
necessarily has the responsibility of controlling, without impairing
students' constitutional rights, student activities which impede the
achievement of these goals. To this end, the university can formulate
its own standards, rewards, and sanctions in keeping with its
educational objectives. Hence, the power arises in the university to
punish conduct which endangers the learning process. The problem,
however, is that in many instances the college has viewed its interests
as unnecessarily broad and has needlessly punished off-campus
student activities violative of the law.4! Still, courts have granted
colleges wide discretion in this area. 4
Though not prohibited by law from prosecuting parallel
administrative actions against students charged with breaches of
criminal law, eight percent of the schools replying had at least
generally abandoned their prerogative. Twenty-three percent*
indicated that they would prosecute within the university community
regardless of the existence of contemporary criminal prosecutions.
University sentiment is clearly divided as to whether to pursue such
administrative actions. Eight percent of the schools replied that their
decision to prosecute depended on the offense charged, while 14
percent normally wait until after the criminal trial to bring any
action. This deferral may or may not be to the student's advantage
depending upon the university's approach. Several schools indicated
that they would not prosecute if they were "satisfied" with the action
of the courts. This practice is objectionable insofar as the university
becomes a court of "higher justice" and may effectively negate the
procedural rights of the student in the criminal action. It would seem
that the university which has deferred its action should not in any case
prosecute if the student is acquitted in the civil courts. Though parallel
41. See Duev. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963); Knight v. State Bd.
of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
42. See Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280,285 (D. Colo. 1968); Zanders v. Board of Educ.,
281 F. Supp. 747, 757 (W.D. La. 1968); 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 874, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 468;
Morris v. Nowotny, 323 S.W.2d 301,312 (rex. Civ. App. 1959).
43. See 233 F. Supp. 396. See note 40 supra.
44. See note41 supra and accompanying text.
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- actions are not unlawful, some universities apparently believe that it is
unfair or wasteful of university resources to pursue them.
Interim Suspension
A problem concerning student pre-hearing rights which his arisen
recently involves "interim suspension," that is, the practice of
suspending a student without a full hearing pending the initiation of a
subsequent disciplinary proceeding.4 5 In Stricklin v. Regents oJ
University of Wisconsin6 the court stated that a university's interim
suspension power could be invoked only in the case of a campus
emergency in which the safety of both students and university
property was seriously threatened.47 In addition, the district court in
Stricklin determined that interim suspensions must be preceded by a
45. Stricklin v. Regents of Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416,419 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
46. Id. at 416; cf. Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Wis. 1968). An earlier case
which considered the problem was Vermillion v. State er rel. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 110
N.W. 736 (1907), in which an interim suspension was upheld, pending a complete hearing, to
preserve order in the school. The precedential validity of the case is doubtful, however, because
the court seemed to rely in part at least on the in locoparentis doctrine, which has been largely
discarded by' later decisions. See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th
Cir. 1961); Zanders v. Board of Educ. 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968).
47. The court in Stricklin, 297 F. Supp. at 420, relied heavily on the Joint Statement on
Rights and Freedoms of Students approved by numerous professional educational associations,
which states that pending disciplinary hearings, the student's status should not be altered
"except for reasons relating to his physical or emotional safety and well-being, or for reasons
relating to the safety and well-being of students, faculty, or university property." Van Alstyne,
supra note 1, at 595.
In Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Wis. 1968), students had seized and
ransacked the President's office, verbally abused him, and had also seized another building,
thereby causing such confusion that the university had to be closed temporarily. In Stricklin,
violent rioting had occurred, but the court held that the temporary suspension bfa student for as
long as thirteen days without a hearing violated due process requirements as set forth in Dixon
and deprived the student unjustifiably of an opportunity to show mistaken identity, extreme
provocation, or other reason for withholding the interim suspension.
48. 297 F. Supp. at 420. Cf Lafferty v. Carter, 310 F. Supp. 465,469-70 (W.D. Wis, 1970).
A recent Oklahoma statute indicates that the judirial faith in the significance of at least a
preliminary hearing before a temporary suspension is not shared by all. OKLA. STAT. ANN, tit.
75, § 301 (Supp. 1969) provides that
a student in a state-supported institution of higher learning against whom a disciplinary
proceeding shall have been conimenced upon sworn affidavit on one of the following
grounds of misconduct, may forthwith be barred from the campus and be removed from
any college or university-owned housing, pending final disposition of the proceeding
against him:
1. participation in a riot as defined by the penal code,
2. possession or sale of any drugs or narcotics prohibited by the penal code;
3. wilful destruction of or wilful damage to state property;
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preliminary hearing to determine whether the continued presence of
the charged students on the campus would endanger persons and
property unless the situation on campus is such that conducting such a
hearing would be unreasonably difficult. In such cases preliminary
hearings must be held at the "earliest practical time." 9
Even the limited endorsement that Stricklin provides for interim
suspension without preliminary hearinge might be questioned under
the reasoning of the recent Supreme Court case, Goldberg v. Kelly.51
In Goldberg th6 Court rejected the interim suspension of welfare
payments without a preliminary hearing, balancing the recipient's
interest in avoiding loss of the payments against the government's
interest in summary preliminary adjudication.5 2 The Court did
indicate that some governmental benefits might be suspended without
such a hearing where the individual's interest was deemed less
important than any potential harm to the public.53 Included as actions
that might be taken without a preliminary hearing were suspension of
exemption from a stock registration requirement, seizure of
mislabeled vitamin products, withdrawal of a contractor's right to do
business with the government, and dismissal of a public employee by
the federal government 4 Though it might be argued that a student
has a "property" right in the completion of his education because of
the critical nature of an education in today's society s and that such
right is sufficiently similar to that of a welfare recipient's benefits to
justify the requirement of a preliminary hearing, 6 the student's right
to an education is not being withdrawn by his temporary suspension
from college.57 The state's interest in the protection of individual
students, the property of such students, and public property would
seem to be greater than its interest in preventing the potential loss of
4. unauthorized presence in or occupation of any part of the campus after resisting an
order to leave by duly constituted authority[.]
This "barring" of a student from campus, like the withholding of bail, might deprive a student
of an opportunity to prepare a proper defense. Cf Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1,4 (195 1).
49. 297 F. Supp. at 420.
50. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
51. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).See generally 33 ALBANY L. REV. 616 (1969).
52. 397 US. at266.
53. Id. at263 n.10.
54. Id.
55. Cf id. at 262 n.8; Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.
1961); 1969 DUKE L.J. 1285, 1291.
56. Cf 1969 DUKE L.J. at 1291.
57. But cf 294 F.2d 157.
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public funds before a* full hearing in the public welfare context. As
long as summary suspension is strictly circumscribed, it is reasonable
for the university to have some leeway in the most intolerable
circumstances to act without a preliminary hearing. Since such a
summary suspension would not deprive a student "of the very means
by which to live,"58 it is doubtful that the Supreme Court would
extend Goldberg's requirements to the campus disorder context.
The question of the form of a preliminary hearing has not been
fully answered, but the Stricklin court indicated in Buck v. Carte59
that the requirement is satisfied by providing a student an early
opportunity to appear before a single officer or an agency of the
university to be informed of the nature of the offense. The student
should also be allowed to make a statement before any decision on
preliminary suspension is reached. Admission of guilt would justify
no further steps before suspension,60 but a detailed denial supported
by names of witnesses would probably require further investigation.6 '
A plausible explanation constituting an excuse or justification for
continued presence on the campus might require a broader revelation
by the university authorities of the source and nature of adverse
information and possibly even necessitate confrontation with
accusers6 2 But the absence of a straightforward denial, explanation,
or excuse justifies withholding a detailed description of the nature and
source of the charges. Although the law is far from settled in this area,
Buck is recommended as an excellent guide for those administrators
who desire to be apprised of future possibilities.6
Of the schools replying, 62 percent maintained the right to
suspend a student in the interim between the bringing of charges and
58. 397 U.S. at 264.
59. Buck v. Carter, 308 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
60. Id. at 1249.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. The opinions in Marzette, Siricklin, and Buck were authored by Judge Doyle sitting in
the western district of Wisconsin. In the welfare area the Supreme Court recently endorsed a
proceeding devoid of a complete record and a comprehenisve opinion as the standard for a
preliminary hearing. 397 U.S. at 271. Presumably, no more would be required by the Supreme
Court of a preliminary hearing in the campus disorder context since the purpose of the
preliminary welfare hearing, to determine the grounds for the discontinuance of payments and
to avoid erroneous termination, id. at 266, is seemingly an appropriate purpose of a
campus preliminary hearing, that is to determine the grounds for suspension or withdrawal of
financial aid and to avoid erroneous termination of such benefits.
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the holding of a formal hearing. Twenty-one percent indicated that
they would not apply such a procedure. Although the grounds for
invoking interim suspension were extremely varied, 45 percent of the
responses appear to meet the legal test of an emergency situation
where the safety of students and university property is involved. The
other grounds listed in the summary results are clearly outside the
mandate of the law. 4 Fifty-two percent of the schools replying had at
least an informal procedure for appeal or review of interim
suspensions, while 11 percent declared that no review or appeal of
interium suspension is provided, a procedure not in compliance with
legal requirements.
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AT THE HEARING
The Requirement of a Hearing
Students under threat of expulsion65 for nonacademic& offenses
must be afforded a hearing which allows the administrative authority
to hear the position of both the college and of the charged students.5
64. For exposition of all the grounds provided by replying schools see the SAMPLE
QUESTIONNAIRE AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS, question 3(k), in the Appendix B infra.
65. It is clear that if a student is threatened with expulsion or suspension for a significant
length of time, a hearing must be afforded. See 297 F. Supp. 416; Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F.
Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968). In Stricklin a suspension for 13 days was held to require a prior
hearing. The commentators have uniformly suggested that due process most likely does not
require a hearing when only minor sanctions, such as social probation, minor fines, or loss of
automobile privileges, are threatened. Professor Van Alstyne has stated that "[w]here the
consequence of error is relatively insubstantial, protection against the risk of error through the
use of elaborate quasi-judicial procedures is subject to a constitutional trade-off with the need
for administrative and fiscal economy." Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1454 (1968). See Wright, supra note
40, at 1069-70. See also General Order, supra note 18, at 142.
66. Courts have traditionally been reticent to interfere in university determinations of
academic achievement. See, e.g., Connelly v. Univ. of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965). The
court stated that college authorities were given absolute discretion in determining whether a
student has been delinquent in his studies," and that in such a case the burden was on the student
to show "arbitrariness, capriciousness, or bad faith." Id. at 160. See also Lesser v. Board of
Educ., 18 App. Div. 2d 388,239 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1963); People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees,
10 II1. App. 2d 207, 134 N.E.2d 635 (1956); Wright, supra note40, at 1069-70.
67. In Dixon, the court held that "due process requires notice and some opportunity for
hearing before students at a tax-supported college are expelled for misconduct." 294 F.2d at
15 1. Accord, Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967); Knight
v. Board of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961). Some states statutorily require that
public school students threatened with expulsion be afforded a hearing. See, e.g.. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § 17 (1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1318 (1962). See generally
General Order, supra note 18; Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 903 (1958); cf Healy v. James, 38 U.S.L.W.
2599 (D.C. Conn. April 24, 1970).
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The rationale for this rule lies in the fourteenth amendment
procedural due process requirement as first applied on campuses in
Dixon where the court found it shocking that a student could be
denied the basic protections afforded a pickpocket 8 The court stated
that even if the student's interests in remaining in college 'did not
amount to a "right"'" he must be given an opportunity to be heard to
protect against the arbitrary application of college regulations, albeit
reasonable ones!" Furthermore, the university cannot circumvent the
hearing requirement by conditioning the student's matriculation on a
waiver of that right, since the court in Dixon explicitly stated that
"the state cannot condition the granting of even a-privilege upon the
renunication of the constitutional right to procedural due process."'"
In response to a question concerning actual practices regarding
formal hearings, only 70 percent of the schools replying indicated that
they had a formal hearing procedure applicable specifically to
campus-wide disorders, while 22 percent answered that they had no
formal procedure to handle such an eventuality. Presumably, such
schools would revert to traditional campus disciplinary methods for
procedures to apply to campus disorders. But the absence of any
formal hearing procedure enhances the possibility that arbitrary and
capricious action might be attempted by campus authorities since
traditional procedures are inherently inappropriate in an emergency
situation. Despite the hearing requirement, some state legislatures
have passed laws in response to student disorders which provide for
expulsion of a student without a hearing, 2 a practice rejected by
present case law.
68. 294 F.2d at 158. The court was quoting Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process,"
70 HARV. L. Rev. 1406, 1407 (1957).
69. The court quoted Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
894 (1961), to the effect that one "may not have a constitutional right to go to Bagdad, but the
Government may not prohibit one from going there unless by means consonant with due process
of law" 294 F.2d at 156.
70. 294 F.2d at 157.
71. Id. at 156.
72. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:310 (1963).
Any student. . . of any institution of higher learning in this state...
(5) ...may be expelled ... from such institution effective immediately upon written
notification of expulsion. . . signed by the president. . . and delivered to the [student's] last
known address. Any person so. . .expelled shall have the right to appeal. . . .Id.
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Impact of the Higher Education Act
Although a recent federal statute 3 directing educational
institutions to deny federal financial aid to students convicted or
participating in disruptive campus activities may be disliked by
universities74 and is arguably discriminatory against the poor student
in favor of the rich,75 its notice and hearing requirement76 encourages
schools desiring to apply the federal sanction to develop a procedural
scheme consistent with the minimal requirements of due process.
However, schools presently providing substantial procedural
protection but desirous of protecting their students' federal financial
aid may be encouraged to ignore their own notice' and hearing
procedures to avoid the mandatory directive of the statutes.
Forty-six percent of the schools replying to the questionnaire
indicated that they would obey the statute, while only six percent
asserted that they would never enforce it. Perhaps the 42 percent not
responding to the question would obey the statute if fully informed of
its provisions and its applicability to their activities. A substantial
73. Higher Education Amendments of 1968 § 504(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1060(a) (Supp. IV,
1969).
If an institution of higher education determines, after affording notice and opportunity
for hearing to an individual attending, or employed by, such institution, that such
individual has been convicted by any court of record of any crime which was committed
after October 16, 1968, and which involved the use of (or assistance to others in the use
of) force, disruption, or the seizure of property under control of any institution of higher
education to prevent officials or students in such institution from engaging in their duties
or pursuing their studies, and that such crime was of a serious nature and contributed to a
substantial disruption of the administration of the institution with respect to which such
crime was committed, then the instituion. . . shall deny for a period of two years any
further payment to, or for the direct benefit of, such'individual under [certain designated
federal student aid programs]. If an institution denies an individual assistance under the
authority of the preceding sentence of this subsection, then any institution which such
individual subsequently attends shall deny for the remainder of the two-year period any
further payment to, or for the direct benefit of, such individual under any of the programs
[designated]. Id. (emphasis added).
Illinois has passed the following analogous statute devoid of section 504(a)'s notice and hearing
requirements: "If the holder of [a state] scholarship . . . participates'in any disorderly
disturbance. . . against the administration. . . using means which are not protected by the
Constitution of this State or of the United States, his scholarship is thereby revoked... "' ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 30-17 (Smith-Hurd, 1961). See generally Saxbe, Student Unrest and the
Law, 18 CiLv. ST. L. REv. 429 (1969).
74. See Comment, Higher Education and the Student Unrest Provisions, 31 OHIO ST. L.J.
111, 117 (1970).
75. See id.; ABA REPORT 34-35.
76. See note 73 supra.
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majority of the schools replying may, therefore, be influenced in their
decisions to provide notice and a hearing by the strictures of the
statute. Indeed, it would b'e ironic if the statute influences schools
sympathetic with its obvious punishment purpose to offer students at
least minimal due process of law while institutions sympathetic to
students' financial necessities and willing to give a student a second
chance, though determined to provide a campus sanction, ignore due
process to avoid mandatory elimination of federal educational
assistance. 7 To escape such a dilemma until the courts have
interpreted the statute, universities might apply the vague language in
the act, such as the words "serious" and "substantial, ' 7 8 to negate
the statute's intended applicability 9
Open v. Closed Hearings
The student has no right to a public hearing," but such an open
hearing might enhance the possibility that the decision of the hearing
board would be more readily accepted by.the student involved and the
university community. Colleges have convincingly argued that this
matter should be left to their discretion since they are-best able to
judge whether public hearings would cause disorder on campuses and
interfere with educational functions8 ' Closed hearings, however, must
be more than informal interviews to accord with due process
requirements! 2 Presumably this means that the procedure of calling a
student before a single administrative official, hearing his
explanation, and imposing a final sanction is unconstitutional 3 One
case has held, however, that a student subjected to such a procedure
77. The statute seems to mandate denial of federal aid only if notice and an opportunity for
hearing are provided. Presumably, the failure to provide minimal due process would relieve a
school of the necessity of revoking a student's federal financial aid.
78. See note 73 supra.
79. Cf 31 OHio ST. L.J., supra note 74, at 122.
80. See Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Zanders v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of the
Univ. of Calif., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867,57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967).
81. See 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463.
82. 294 F.2d 150; see 5 HOUSTON L. RaIv. 541 (1968).
83. But see Wright v. Texas So. Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex. 1967), affd 392 F.2d 728
(5th Cir. 1968), in which the Fifth Circuit interpreted its ruling in Dixon by holding that a
student who explained his actions to both the Dean and President of the university and was then
expelled was not denied due process because he "offered no evidence to establish the inadequacy
of such hearings or to show that he was prejudiced by the lack of more." Id at 73 1.
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must affirmatively show that he was prejudiced thereby in order to
sustain his constitutional claim of procedural inadequacyp.
As indicated in the summary of findings, 49 percent of the schools
responding have elected either to require closed hearings or to leave
the matter to the discretion of the particular student charged. Thus, a
significant number of universities are apparently willing to risk
student criticism for failing to provide public hearings in order to
assure a more orderly proceeding.
Joint Trials
The question of a student's right to be tried jointly with fellow
demonstrators, or conversely, singly despite his participation in a
mass demonstration, has not been expressly litigated.P Although the
matter is presently left entirely to the discretion of the university, the
advantages to, the college of a joint hearing are manifold. Time would
be conserved, and all the proof could be presented at one time, thus
alleviating the difficulty of preserving evidence. On the other hand, a
joint hearing involving 30 or 40 defendants may easily become a focal
point for student dissent and may catalyze further disruptions.
Additional pressure for the holding of joint hearings may also come
from the students themselves, who might feel that there is strength in
numbers. Forty-seven percent of the universities replying allowed joint
trials, while 20 percent explicitly rejected them. The remainder failed
to respond to the question, possibly indicating an ad hoc approach to
the issue.
Composition of the Hearing Board
Membership. The composition of the hearing board itself has been
scrutinized by both courts and commentators. The question of the
membership of the panel, as well as the question of whether persons
otherwise members may bring charges or act as complaining
witnesses, has been the subject of controversy. There do not seem to
be any constitutional commands in determining who should be
designated as members of the hearing board, but commentators have
uniformly suggested that the panel be comprised of a cross section of
84. Id. Cf Tantra v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924); Woods v. Simpson,
146 Md. 547, 126 A. 882 (1924).
85. For a discussion of joint trials of criminal defendants, see Note, The Admission of a
Codefendant's Confession After Bruton v. United States: The Questions and a Proposal for
Their Resolution, 1970 DUKE L.J. 329.
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the university community--students, faculty, and administrators!,
The rationale for this position is that since the inquiry of the panel
concerns the university as an ongoing institution, those on the panel
should reflect the divergent views of those in the academic community
concerned with the proper functioning of the university. The inclusion
of students on the hearing panel would legitimize it in the eyes of the
charged student since he would be judged in part by his peers.
Additionally, membership on the board of a person with legal training
would aid in rendering evidentiary and other procedural decisions.
Tabulation of the student disorder questionnaires revealed that,
although the composition of hearing boards ranged from totally
administration personnel to all students, many included some form of
cross-section of the campus community. Eighty-four percent included
at least one student, while only 17 percent of the panels were
composed solely of one of the tripartite campus elements. A
commitment to include students and a tendency to integrate dominant
campus groups on theboard is clear.
Alleged Board Bias. The question of bias, on the other hand,
presents a more difficult problem. Students have complained that they
were denied a fair hearing because the hearing board included persons
directly concerned with the students' prosecution 7 Generally, these
claims of bias have met little success. In Jones v. State Board of
Education,m for example, the students' claim of bias was based on the
fact that two members of the hearing board also testified against the
students at the hearing. The court held that there was no violation of
due process because the students failed to show any actual bias or
prejudice by the board against the claimants' It thus appears that due
86. See, e.g., Comment, Private Government on the Campus-Judicial Review of University
Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1363 (1963); 53 MINN. L. REv., supra note 24, at 321 n.l11; ef
Witherspoon v. United States, 391 US. 510 (1968).
87. See, e.g., Jones v. Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
88. Id.
89. The court distinguished Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967), which stated
impliedly at least that no member of the hearing panel should have participated in the
investigation of the student's conduct. The Jones court stated that since the students did not
positively show bias, "[t]here is no violation of procedural due process when a member of a
disciplinary body at a university sits on a case after he has shared with other members
information concerning the facts of a particular incident. . . .This limited combination by a
school administrative body of prosecutorial and adjuidicatory functions is not fundamentally
unfair in the absence of a showing of other circumstances, such as malice or personal interest in
the outcome of a case." 279 F. Supp. at 200. See Wright v. Texas So. Univ., 277 F. Supp.
110 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
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process does not require strict separation of functions although any
combination of prosecutorial and adjudicatory roles will be closely
scrutinized by the courtsY0 Where at all possible, universities should
avoid this highly suspect practice.
A majority of the schools replying to the questionnaire prohibited
both a testifying school official and a university witness to sit on the
board. Only 20 percent allowed the first practice, while 13 percent
allowed the latter. However, even these figures indicate some
acceptance of a highly questionable practice.
Right to Counsel
During the course of the hearing, the college should arguably
permit the student to be represented by counsel who is permitted to
participate fully in the proceeding, even if the college is not likewise
represented. The authorities are far from unanimous on this point;9
however, since some cases have held that the presence of counsel is a
necessary prerequisite to insure the fairness that due process
demands,92 universities would be prudent to permit counsel in order to
protect against subsequent judicial interference. The courts which
have denied the right to counsel have assumed that the presence of a
lawyer is not the sine qua non of a hearing that is "fundamentally
90. See 382 F.2d at 813. The commentators have uniformly condemned this combination
of functions as being both constitutionally questionable and unnecessary.See, e.g., Van Alstyne,
supra note 12, at 594 n.30.
91. Numerous cases have stated that due process does not require "defendant's" counsel to
be present at university disciplinary hearings. See Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778,786
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228
(S.D.W. Va.), affd 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 US. 905 (1969); Buttny v.
Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir.
1967). However, some of these cases are distinguishable in their factual situations from the
present inquiry. In Barker, the hearing board did not have an adjudicative function, but was
merely to find facts and make recommendations to the President and faculty who could act on
them or not as they chose. Had the hearing board possessed an adjudicative role, the court
implied that counsel would have been necessary. For a discussion of Barker. see 71 W. VA. L.
REv. 187 (1969). In Madera, the court said that counsel was not necessary in a proceeding before
a hearing panel which was to decide whether a highschool student should be readmitted,
transferred, or transferred with parents' consent to a school for maladjusted children. In
Wasson, concerning a student at the Merchant Marine Academy, the court admitted that the
governmental interest in maintaining and instilling discipline was higher than at a non-military
school.
92. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); Zanders v.
Board of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277
F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967). See generally Note, Right to Counsel in Public Welfare
Hearings, 48 BOSTON U.L. REv. 468 (1968).
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fair. 9 3 The reason for this position most likely lies in traditional
judicial unwillingness to intrude into university affairs due to a lack of
expertise in academic matters and a belief that colleges should remain
autonomous." Additionally, Dixon, cited in almost every subsequent
case dealing with the right to counsel problem, did not impose a
counsel requirement and specifically rejected the necessity of a "full-
dress judicial hearing"' s5 which the presence of counsel would seem to
impose. Nevertheless, the recent cases upholding the requirement of
counsel have undoubtedly relied on the traditional role that counsel
fulfills in any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding." It would seem
that these latter authorities should be followed to assure the fair
treatment of students and the affirmance of board decisions. 7 There
seems to be no authority, however, for the proposition that where the
charged student cannot afford an attorney, the college should provide
one.
Fifty-seven percent of the schools replying asserted that a student
had the right to the assistance of counsel at a hearing. Ninety-one
percent of those indicating that the student did not have the right to
counsel nevertheless guaranteed his right to be accompanied by an
advisor without legal training, and 74 percent indicated that there was
no restriction on the type of non-legal advisor the student might have.
Only three percent of the'schools replied that they would provide
93. See, e.g., 386 F.2d 778; 283 F. Supp. 118.
94. Cf. Carr v. St. John's Univ., 34 Misc. 2d 319,231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd 17 App.
Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403, 410, affd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 802, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834, 187
N.E.2d 18 (1962); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 130 Misc. 249, 255, 223 N.Y.S. 796, 804 (Sup.
Ct. 1927), rev'd, 224 App. Div. 487,231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928); cf. McGuinis v. Walker, 40 N.E.2d
488 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941). In Anthony, the appellate division, in reversing the trial court, upheld
an expulsion based on the administrative determination that the student involved was not a
"typical Syracuse girl." The court stated that as long as the university was not acting arbitarily
-ir had some reason, even if not divulged, for the expulsion-and the expulsion would be up-
held. 224-App. Div. at 491. One ommentator has stated that "[r]egardless of the type of
rationale employed by the courts . . . the overall impact of adjudication in student-university
controversies has been characterized by judicial reluctance to interfere with the action of the
university." Goldman, The University and the Liberty of its Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54
KY. L.J. 643, 654 (1966). See generally Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student
Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 290 (1968); Note, Expulsion of College and
ProfessionalStudents-Rights andRemedies, 30 NOTRE DAME LAW, 174 (1963); Comment, The
College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings, 13 S.D.L. REV. 87 (1968).
95. 294 F.2dAt 159.
96. See also French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969); Zanders v. Board of
Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp.
649 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
97. See 53 MINN. L. REV., supra note 24, at 323.
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funds for an attorney if the student desired, with one-third of those
basing their provisions of funds on the student's indigency. Fifty-four
percent indicate-d that the administration had the right to be
represented by counsel, while 21 percent asserted that it did not. Since
the law is far from settled in the area, a majority of schools replying
were at least in compliance with existing case law by affording the
right to counsel to students at administrative hearings concerning
campus disorders. But the data obtained from the questionnaire also
indicate that a substantial number of schools prefer a situation where
neither the student nor the administration is represented by counsel, a
position possibly reflecting a dearth of legally-trained personnel to
conduct a strict adversary proceeding and a fear of the complexity and
formalism of such a proceeding.
Confrontation and Cross-Examination
There is authority for the proposition that a student should be able
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him,9 although
some courts have held that these procedural safeguards are not
required 9  Were such a responsibility imposed, colleges have argued,
it would be impossible to execute because of the university's inability
to compel witnesses to appear and testify. Furthermore, even were
witnesses to appear of their own volition, they would not be under
oath in most instances and thus could not be punished for perjured
testimony.1°0 However, in most of the recent cases confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses have been allowed before hearing
boards with judicial approval. 01' The advice to universities seeking to
98. As early as 1887 a court held that the student was entitled to know what testimony had
been given against him, and by whom it had been delivered, and that the proofs be made openly
and in his presence, with a full opportunity to question the witnesses and to call others to explain
or contradict their testimony." Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. Co. Ct.-77, 82
(1887). See Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967); In re
Carter, 262 N.C. 360, 137 S.E.2d 150 (1964).
99. The court in Dixon stated that "a full dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-
examine witnesses, is [not] required." 294 F.2d at 159. See State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180
Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943). There the court stated, "As
to the right to meet his accusers face to face in an investigation of wrongdoing, we cannot fail to
note that honorable students do not like to be known as snoopers and informers against their
fellows. . . .In these circumstances they should not be subject to a cross-examination. .. "
180 Tenn. at 110, 171 S.W.2d at 826. See also Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir.
1967); Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959).
100. At least one court has accepted this argument. See State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81
Mont. 200, 263 P. 433, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928).
101. See, e.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725, 731 (M.D. Ala. 1968);
Zanders v. Board of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 766 (W.D. La. 1968); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F.
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preserve institutional autonomy and to avoid court interference
should be obvious.
But it is not clear whether the student's attorney must be allowed
to conduct the cross-examination. The most recent case which
afforded the student the fullest panoply of procedural rights required
only that the student himself be allowed to cross-examine, 02 and no
case has held that the student's counsel must be permitted to cross-
examine university witnesses. 0 3 If, despite the foregoing, the
university chooses to present its case against the charged student by
the reports of complaining witnesses, the student must be furnished
the names of these witnesses and an oral or written report of their
testimony' °4 to acquire some idea of the adverse evidence.
Eighty-one percent of the schools replying recognized a student's
right to hear the evidence against him, while only one percent did not
provide such a right. Ninety percent of those refusing to allow the
student to hear the evidence against him did furnish the student with
the names of those testifying or a report of what was "said by them.
Since the right to confrontation is not yet settled in this context, only
10 percent of those replying have procedures clearly violative of
present law. Of those schools recognizing a student's right to counsel,
only 77 percent allowed such counsel to cross-examine administration
witnesses as to all matters in question. Ninety-two percent of those
schools which did not allow cross-examination by the student's
counsel did allow the student to cross-examine, while only eight
percent rejected both alternatives. Such liberal enforcement of the
right of confrontation and cross-examination contrasts sharply with
the fact that only 24 percent of the schools replying maintained the
right of compulsory process, 47 percent indicating that they did not
Supp. 280,288 (D. Colo. 1968).
102. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649,652 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
103. At least one commentator has strongly urged, however, that there appears to be no valid
reason why counsel should not be permitted to cross-examine. Professor Van Alstyne has stated:
"There appears to be little reason to forbid so customary a function of counsel, reserving to the
hearing board substantial discretion to limit counsel's participation to avoid unreasonable
delay, harassment, or simple grandstanding." Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 594 n29.
104. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961). See State ex
rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 109-10, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826 (1942). See generally
Developments in the Law-A cademic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1140-41 (1968); Note,
School Expulsions and Due Process, 1 IND. LEGAL F. 413,423 (1968); 53 MINN. L. REV., supra
note 24, at 322-23; 38 NoTRE DAME LAW., supra note 94, at 181 (discussion of a student's right
to confront and cross-esamine the witnesses against him). See also General Order, 45 F.R.D.
133, 147 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (en bane).
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maintain the prerogative of compelling students or staff to appear as
the charged student's witnesses. Colleges and universities are willing
to recognize confrontation of witnesses and cross-examination, even
though they apparently still overwhelmingly reject the right to apply
compulsory process. Without compulsory process the efficacy of
confrontation and cross-examination is suspect.
Right to Introduce Favorable Testimony
Favorable Witnesses. The student must be allowed to present the
oral testimony or written affidavits of his own witnesses before the
hearing panel.1° Since the function of the hearing panel is basically to
discover particular facts to determine whether university regulations
have been violated, the courts have held that students should be
allowed to present their version of the factual circumstances to assure
a fair evaluation. In balancing the student's interest in remaining in
school against the possible interruption of university functions that a
full hearing might engender, the courts have opted to allow a student
to pursue his case through witnesses, a practice which impinges very
slightly on institutional functions.106 Since presenting evidence
through witnesses is the established manner of proceeding in
adjudications, courts have readily accepted this procedure in the
campus context.
Schools replying to the questionnaire also demonstrated a similar
acceptance. Eighty-one percent of the schools replying recognized a
student's right to testify and call witnesses on his own behalf; only one
percent rejected such right.
Absence of Self-Incrimination Privilege. In presenting his case,
however, it appears that the student may not exercise a privilege
against self-incrimination even if he may be later subject to criminal
prosecution for his activity.0 7 The single court which has focused on
105. See Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); Esteban v. Central Mo.
State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967); cf. Geiger v. Milford Independent
School Dist., 51 Pa. D. & C. 647 (C.P. Pike Co. 1944). But see Duev. Fla. A. & M. Univ., 233 F.
Supp. 396,403 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
106. See, e.g., 294 F.2d at 159.
107. Furutani v. Ewigleben, 297 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Cal. 1969). In Furutani. students
participated in campus disturbances for which they became subject to both institutional and
criminal sanctions. They sought an injunction delaying campus hearings until after the
completion of local proceedings, arguing that in order to avoid expulsion they might be forced to
incriminate themselves at the hearings. The court denied the injunction, citing Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), as authority for the proposition that the students could well be able
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the question reasoned that the student might be able to exclude
damaging statements made at campus hearings from introduction
into evidence at subsequent criminal proceedings, thereby somewhat
lessening the necessity for the privilege.' The student whose alleged
activities are violative of both campus rules and local law may
incriminate himself to avoid expulsion and then attempt to rely on
Garrity"'0 to escape a later criminal conviction resulting from his
earlier statements. This tortuous procedure appears legal but offers
little security to students wishing to present all pertinent evidence.
Fortunately, 71 percent of the schools replied that they recognized
a student's privilege against self-incrimination at the hearing, while
only four percent positively rejected such right. Apparently, a
majority of schools in practice refuse to place the student in the
Procrustean dilemma of choosing between risking expulsion and
providing the local authorities with prejudicial evidence.
Evidentiary Requirements
Rules of Evidence. In conducting the hearing itself the college is
not required to follow any rules of evidence." 0 However,
commentators have suggested, and common sense would seem to
demand, that some standards of relevance and materiality should be
maintained to preclude the utilization of unreliable information.",
Results from the questionnaire reveal that 20 percent of the
schools to some degree follow the evidence rules relating to hearsay,
relevancy, and materiality. Ten percent reported that they followed all
three rules as closely as possible, while only 17 percent acknowledged
that they followed no specific legal rules in conducting their hearings.
Although the actual practice is widely divergent, a substantial number
of schools attempt at least a minimal structuring of the evidentiary
portions of their hearings.
to exclude any self-incriminatory statements in subsequent local proceedings. See Madcra v.
Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967); Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 248
Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). But see State er rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn.
99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), in which the court stated "students should not be compelled to give
evidence incriminating themselves...." id. at 826. See notes 35-39 supra and accompanying
text.
108. 297 F. Supp. at 1165.
109. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
110. See Goldb erg v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867,883,57 Cal, Rptr.
463,475 (1967).
111. See 72 YALE L.J., supra note 85, at 1406-07; 53 MINN. L. REv., supra note 24, at 324.
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Quantum of Proof. The hearing board must base its decision on
"substantial evidence 112 and only on the evidence presented during
the proceedings.113 It should be noted, however, that seldom have the
decisions of disciplinary panels been overturned by the courts on the
basis that there was insufficient evidence to support the charges
against the student."4 Nevertheless, one district court has called this
"substantial evidence" rule one of the minimal requirements growing
out of the concept of fundamental fairness implicit to procedural due
process 5 This particular matter is seldom explicitly brought to the
attention of the courts since the charged student's activities are
frequently not a matter of serious doubt. The evidence of his
participation in the disruptive activities is often not only substantial
but overwhelming 1
Burden of Proof. The question of who has the burden of proof in a
disciplinary hearing has seldom been explicitly litigated, although
proceedings have been upheld in which the student was expected to
convince the administration of his innocence.1 7 In practical terms, the
burden of proof issue may not be critical to the defendant-student
112. The court in Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1968), quoted its
own General Order for the conclusion that "no disciplinary action [may] be taken on grounds
which are not supported by any substantial evidence." Id. at 171.
113. In Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967), the court
stated that the "President shall determine the facts of each case solely on the evidence presented
at the hearing .... Id. at 652. But see Jones v. Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D.
Tenn. 1968). There the court suggested that divulging of information concerning the
particularities of the facts of a specific case by one board member to another would not violate
due process.
114. But see 291 F. Supp. at 167-70; Knight v. Board of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 180-81
(M.D.Tenn. 1961).
115. General Order, supra note 18, at 147.
116. See, e.g., 248 Cal. App. 2d at 871 n.4, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 466 n.4. But see 291 F. Supp.
161, in which the university charged Scoggin with planning and participating in a demonstration
which led to the destruction of university property. However, the university did not show that
Scoggin planned a violent demonstration or himself destroyed any property. The court stated
that there was no substantial evidence to prove anything except that Scoggin planned a peaceful
demonstration which had been previously impliedly authorized by the President. Id. at 169. The
court therefore ordered reinstatement.
117. In Jones v. Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), the students argued
that they were denied due process because the question to be decided by the hearing board was
whether the students would be readmitted thus placing the burden on the plaintiff students. The
court summarily rejected this argument, stating that "[d]isciplinary proceedings conducted by
an educational institution are not to be tested according to the niceties of procedure required in a
court of law. Inquiry into the technicalities governing burden of proof in civil or criminal trials
is, therefore, irrelevant. Id. at 202. Accord, Cornette v. Aldridge, 408 S.W.2d 935,942 (Tex. Ct.
Civ. App. 1966). But see Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 77, 82 (1887).
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even with the substantial evidence rule noted above,"' since only one
percent of the schools replying place the burden on the student to
establish his innocence. Forty-four percent of the institutions placed
the burden of proof on the administration to establish the guilt of the
student. Of the 45 percent responding fully to the burden of proof
question, a substantial majority required either proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt or upon a preponderance of the evidence,
quantums of proof presumably well within the judicial standard of
"substantial evidence." Fifty-five percent of the replies failed to
identify the party with the burden of proof, perhaps indicating an
absence of any consistent test.
Limitations on Evidence Considered. On the other hand, the
requirement that the panel decide the issue at hand solely on the
evidence presented has been litigated more frequently."' This problem
frequently occurs in a small community, such as a university, where
members of the hearing panel are likely to have some previous
knowledge of the specific factual circumstances surrounding the
activities of the students being heard. However, board members must
not rely on their own first-hand knowledge of the facts. This issue is
somewhat similar to the discussion above 21 concerning board
members combining adjudicatory and prosecutorial roles. It seems
inevitable that in such situations the panel member will have at least
an implicit personal interest in the outcome of the case and thus will
not be impartial 21 To the extent that such partiality can practically
be obviated by not allowing complaining witnesses to sit on the
hearing board, the proceedings will be fairer. Furthermore, the
members of the board should not base their decision on confidential
reports which the charged student does not have the opportunity to see
or rebut. Of course, if the student is given the name of the informant
and an oral or written report of the informant's testimony, the
evidentiary and confrontation problems would most likely be lessened
if not eliminated!22
Seventy-three percent of the replying institutions reported that
only evidence presented at the hearing was considered in determining a
student's guilt or innocence; only six percent answered that their
118. See notes 112-16 supra and accompanying text.
119. Cf notes 86-90 supra and accompanying text.
120. See id.
121. See Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 594 n.30,
122. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
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hearing decisions were based at least partially on evidence acquired
outside the hearing, a practice violative of present law.
Moral Justification
In keeping with the standard of "fundamental fairness"
announced in the casestm it is desirable to permit the charged students
to testify concerning moral justifications, motives, and reasons for
their acts to assist in the determination of the appropriate sanction.
Such explanations serve both the student, as mitigating factors, and,
at least in theory, the university, as a release of student grievances
concerning alleged campus injustices.
Forty-nine percent of the schools replying indicated that they
allowed such evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence; 50 percent
allowed it on the issue of appropriate sanction. Nineteen percent
rejected this type of evidence in determining innocence or guilt, while
only 10 percent explicitly rejected it in determining the proper
sanction. Based on the questionnaire sample, at least one-half of
American colleges and universities are willing to accept moral
jusitification as direct evidence in a'campus disorder hearing,
although such evidence is generally irrelevant in establishing a
student's guilt or innocence. Admission of such evidence on that latter
issue hardly comports with the goal of reliably determining the truth
or falsity of the charges. Extensive admission of such evidence on all
issues raised at the hearing, converting the proceedings into a political
forum, could lessen their value as a fact-seeking mechanism.
Indications from the questionnaire that such a practice is prevalent
within a substantial number of colleges and universities is ground for
serious concern unless closely monitored.
Preparation and Dissemination of Transcript
For the student to prosecute an effective appeal from the decision
of the hearing board, the university should provide a transcript of the
proceedings. Due process does not require that such a stenographic or
mechanical recording be made,124 but both the college and the charged
123. In Jones v. Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 205 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), the court states,
"It is axiomatic that the exigencies of university life require the formulation and enforcement of
rules of student conduct, and a court of law will not interfere with this function when. . . the
university has proceeded in a manner that is fundamentally fair and reasonable." Id. at 205.See
Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Kobiltz v. Western
Reserve Univ., 11 Ohio C.D. 515 (Cir. Ct. 1901).
124. See 233 F. Supp. at 403.
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student must be permitted to record the proceedings at their own
expense.ss At least one commentator has suggested that in order to
insure fairness and facilitate an appeal, a simple tape recording of the
entire proceedings could be" made from which a typed transcript could
be prepared if necessary. 26
Fifty-three percent of the schools replying allowed the student to
make a transcript of the hearing, and 20 percent expressly denied the
student such a right, thus directly rejecting present case law. Forty-
nine percent provided a transcript for a student financially unable to
provide one himself; only 21 percent directly refused such a service.
Again, the statistics demonstrate that a substantial number of schools
have adopted procedures superior to the current law in the area,
thereby enabling a student to appeal effectively from an adverse
hearing board decision.
Publication of Hearing Board Decision
Once a decision has been reached by the hearing board, the results
of the proceedings must be written," 7 made public, and made
available for the student's inspection.'1 Only 36 percent of the schools
replying indicated that they performed such a function. Furthermore,
the board must make specific findings as to the student's guilt or
innocence of the conduct charged,' presumably to enable the student
to prepare specific objections to these findings and thus prosecute an
effective appeal to a higher administrative authority. Only 58 percent
of the schools replying reported that they prepared specific findings,
19 percent indicating that they definitely did not, thereby revealing a
continuing practice which is undesirable if not illegal.
POST-HEARING RIGHTS: APPELLATE REVIEW
No case has held that a college must provide for institutional
review of the hearing panel's decision, but procedures embodying such
an appellate framework have been impliedly endorsed by courts which
state that the student has a right to make a transcript of the
125. See 277 F. Supp. at 652.
126. Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 594 n.32. Professor Van Alstyne's suggestion, in light of
its simplicity and ease of administration, seems desirable to obviate disputes over the evidence
presented at the hearing.
127. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649,652 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
128. 294 F.2d at 159; Woody v. Bums, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), citing, 233
F. Supp. 396.
129. 277 F. Supp. at 652.
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proceedings before the hearing panel.3 It would appear that some
appellate procedure would be desirable from both the student's and
the administration's point of view. Appellate review would benefit the
student by serving as a safeguard against individual arbitrariness of
the hearing panel and aid the university by correcting procedural
errors which, if left unanswered, might result in judicial intervention
and reversal on petition of the students involved. To accomplish these
ends, a procedure of automatic review by the President or other higher
university official would be adequate and desirable 31
Fifty-seven percent of the institutions replying to the questionnaire
asserted that they provided some type of appellate procedure for
students charged with violation of university regulations concerning
campus-wide disorders. Only three percent answered that they
provided no such appellate review. As shown on the summary of
results, the grounds for review varied greatly, but a tendency can be
discerned to allow appeal on any grounds or on the basis of error in
procedure at the hearing. Appeal based on new evidence or excessive
punishment also received significant support among the schools
replying to the questionnaire. The president of the university was the
most popular choice as a campus appellate agency with substantial
responses also supporting the board of trustees or an appeal
committee. The high percentage of "no responses" to the appellate
review questions possibly indicate a lack of any uniform procedure.
CONCLUSION
Though many schools have kept pace with legal developments in
the student disorder area or even advanced ahead of such
developments, results of the questionnaire reveal that many existing
procedures fail to satisfy even the minimal current requirements of
due process. The survey justifies the initial evaluation that most
schools desire both to treat students fairly within the law and to
protect life and property through the application of reasonable
judicial procedures. Departures from the, present state of the law
concerning collegiate due process have been noted throughout.
Whether or not a particular institution desires and needs a detailed
judicial code, it is believed that no school should engage in a
systematic disregard of the law or consistently apply fundamentally
130. Id; see Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 882, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 463,474 (1967).
13 1. See generally 72 YALE L.J., supra note 85, at 1407-08.
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unfair procedures to its students. It is sincerely hoped that this project
will contribute to the termination of such practices wherever they exist
and encourage all colleges and universities to explore the possibility of
providing fairer, more effective, and more efficient means of handling
allegedly disruptive students within the chaos often precipitated by
campus disorders.
